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The
Pandemic Influenza Plan: Implications for Local Law Enforcement
By Lee Colwell, DPA, President,
Pegasus Research Foundation
"The question
of the next pandemic is when, not if." Rep. Tom Davis, R-VA,
Chairman, Government Reform Committee
November 4, 2005
In November 2005, following
several years of concern, discussion and planning in related matters,
the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services released the
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (the "Plan"). Post-outbreak
action under the Plan-if and when that becomes necessary-will
require taking steps in the public square that are highly unusual,
possibly unprecedented in both nature and scope, and almost certainly
highly controversial, particularly in hind sight. Because local
law enforcement will be deeply involved in any such steps, significant
pre-planning is called for by law enforcement to be taken in coordination
with others with post-outbreak responsibilities.
The Plan begins to
articulate the significant additional responsibilities that local
law enforcement will have in the event of a pandemic-duties which
are in addition to the day-to-day duties already carried out by
law enforcement-and presents local law enforcement leaders and
their communities with a significant challenge to develop regional
pandemic preparedness plans at the local level. Over the coming
months, as President Bush and HHS continue to push forward with
pandemic preparedness efforts, local law enforcement leaders will
face a variety of decisions about how they and their communities
will respond to the pandemic threat. This article is written to
provide background information on the Plan for local law enforcement
leaders who will be facing those decisions.
Overview
The Plan states that a pandemic influenza event occurs "when
a novel influenza virus emerges that can infect and be efficiently
transmitted among individuals because of a lack of pre-existing
immunity in the population." Although it is possible that
post-outbreak action under the Plan will never be necessary, the
Plan has been prepared by HHS, and over $7 Billion in Federal
funding requested for its implementation, because there is great
concern about the likelihood of a worldwide influenza epidemic
occurring in the very near future-claiming hundreds of millions
of lives, including as many as 700,000 Americans within 6 months
of an outbreak. Current pandemic concerns have been triggered
by the strain of avian influenza (or "bird flu") circulating
in Asia and Europe, with a reported 50% mortality rate among those
humans infected.
The Plan is nearly
400 pages in length, and each page is packed with detailed considerations
that should be considered by public and private sector officials-public
health, hospitals, law enforcement, transportation, and local,
tribal, state and Federal officials-in putting together specific
local-level and regional plans to respond to a pandemic influenza
event. With respect to "State and Local Pandemic Influenza
Plans", the Plan states:
These plans should
detail how health departments and other agencies of state and
local governments and tribal nations will prevent, mitigate, respond
and recover from an influenza pandemic. They should be community
specific where appropriate and should contemplate specific local
and community needs.
Fully recognizing that
non-Federal health departments, hospitals, emergency responders
and private sector firms will, of necessity, play critical front-line
roles in the event of a pandemic, the Plan is heavily built around
providing detailed guidance for local law enforcement, emergency
responders and other state and local partners in areas such as
"Community Disease Control and Prevention" and "Managing
Travel-Related Risk of Disease Transmission."
Characteristics
of a Pandemic and Implications for Law Enforcement
Among other things, the Plan assumes that an influenza pandemic
would have the following characteristics which would directly
impact local law enforcement:
--Simultaneous or near-simultaneous outbreaks in communities across
the U.S., thereby limiting the ability of any jurisdiction to
provide support and assistance to other areas;
--Delays and shortages in the availability of vaccines and antiviral
drugs; and
--Potential disruption of national and community infrastructures
including transportation, commerce, utilities and public safety
due to widespread illness and death among workers and their families
and concern about on-going exposure to the virus.
A key principal of
the Plan is that preparedness will require coordination among
federal, state and local government and partners in the private
sector, including significant requirements for coordination with
local law enforcement. Although the Plan recognizes that law enforcement
will also have key roles in other aspects of a pandemic, the Plan
especially focuses on the need for local law enforcement to be
prepared and assist in controlling diseases at the community level
and in managing the risk of disease transmission through enforcement
of travel restrictions.
Law Enforcement
Role in Community Disease Control
Prior to a pandemic event, the Plan urges that local leaders prepare
their communities for implementation of pandemic influenza containment
measures which may be called into play during a pandemic. Community
disease control measures range from individual containment measures
to community-based containment measures.
At the individual level,
law enforcement personnel may be called upon to contain the spread
of infection by enforcing the isolation of individual patients
and by managing individuals who may have come into contact with
sources of infection. These steps may be carried out by enforced
isolation at healthcare facilities, individual homes or alternative
facilities which may become necessary. The Plan urges local law
enforcement leaders to prepare to provide guards and other personnel
necessary to isolate patients with a highly infectious disease,
and persons who have come in contact with them, at multiple facilities
in their communities.
At the community level,
the Plan describes containment measures involving local law enforcement
which range from voluntary "snow days", to closure of
office buildings, shopping malls, schools and public transportation,
to widespread community quarantine (or "cordon sanitaire").
In the voluntary "snow day" scenario, when the public
is asked to stay at home rather than go about their normal daily
business, law enforcement leaders will need to communicate staffing
decisions about non-essential personnel who should honor the "snow
day" declaration. If public facilities and public transportation
are closed, local law enforcement will doubtless also be called
upon to enforce facility and transportation closure orders, and
to provide essential transport for supplies, patients and public
health personnel. And, if a community quarantine is ordered, local
law enforcement agencies will further be called upon to legally
enforce the order, in coordination with involved public health
officials and personnel in neighboring jurisdictions.
Law Enforcement
Role in Managing Travel-Related Risks of Disease Transmission
In the event of a pandemic, law enforcement will be involved with
managing all types of travel, but local law enforcement will have
particular responsibility for managing travel-related risk for
travel within the United States. The Plan urges that travel-restriction
planning in preparation for a pandemic engage a broad range of
health and community leaders, including public health and hospital
personnel, local law enforcement, firefighters, political leaders,
and representatives of airports, seaports, transportation service
providers and others.
The Plan identifies
a number of additional new travel restriction-related activities
which local law enforcement personnel will need to be prepared
to carry out, once a pandemic event has commenced. These activities
will include: meeting and transporting ill or possibly infected
passengers and animals at airports and seaports; notifying the
public and neighboring jurisdictions of official closures and
enforcing those closures; addressing and coordinating multi-jurisdictional
issues involved in official closures; and establishing legal authority
and protocols for restricting departure and entry and use of mass
transit systems, bus and train routes, streets and highways.
Observations and
Conclusions
It is clear, even from this brief discussion, that a pandemic
event would require a number of complex decisions to be made by
local law enforcement leaders, and trigger a number of complex
problems for law enforcement leaders and personnel. The Plan triggers
a number of questions and issues for local law enforcement, such
as:
--What is the chain of command, and who will make decisions, during
a pandemic event?
--What legal authority is there for the actions to be taken by
law enforcement?
--What orders will be lawful or unlawful in such circumstances?
--What vaccines and anti-viral and other medications will local
law enforcement personnel (and their families) be offered, and
how can leaders assure their personnel that the offered vaccines
and medication are safe and effect?
--What problems will local law enforcement leaders face if vaccines
and medication are not provided to law enforcement personnel and
their families?
--How can law enforcement leaders assure their personnel that
it is safe to carry out their sworn duties requiring close contact
with highly-infectious persons?
--How will local law enforcement securely communicate with public
health partners, their own agency personnel, and personnel in
neighboring jurisdictions?
--What will local law enforcement leaders communicate to the media
and the public regarding the law enforcement actions taken in
the face of a pandemic event? How will rumors inside agencies
and in public circulation be countered?
--What level of force will law enforcement use to enforce an individual
containment or community-based quarantine measure?
--What steps should law enforcement leaders take to maintain control
and authority without over-stepping roles and over-stating or
under-stating risks?
--What lessons have been learned from recent experiences with
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the 2003 SARS outbreak, especially
travel-related containment measures imposed in Toronto?
--How will law enforcement carry out their traditional duties
while also carrying out these significant additional responsibilities,
and where will the financial and personnel resources required
to carry out these additional responsibilities come from?
--How will local law enforcement leaders and their counterparts
in hospitals, public health, transportation sectors, local government
and local and State political leaders-not only in their own jurisdictions
but in neighboring jurisdictions-come together to make meaningful
plans as urged in the HHS Plan?
On this last and most
important issue, the HHS request for funding includes $100 million
"to help states complete and exercise their pandemic plans
before a pandemic strikes." Based on previous efforts at
State-directed planning of community-level and local agency-level
activities-many of which have been highly unsuccessful-it is not
at all clear that leaders of communities and local agencies will
have the tools or resources sufficient to catalyze local-level
planning for an uncertain new threat. Although much of the planning
for a pandemic needs to be carried out by State public health
departments, certainly much of the planning also needs to take
place at the local level, between and among local level emergency
responders and others in their communities. Local law enforcement
leaders should express their views to Congress on the likelihood
of success of State-directed planning of activities which inherently
must be carried out by local level personnel.
The Plan makes it clear
that it does not provide answers to these or many, many, other
questions, and that, as "one size does not fit all",
each community must develop its own plan in order to be prepared.
Recent events show the peril faced by communities when Federal,
State and local agencies and their leaders are unable to work
as a seamless force fully prepared to respond to the threat at
hand. Because local law enforcement will play such a key role
in the event of a pandemic, forward-looking local law enforcement
leaders will take steps to prepare their agencies and their communities
to very promptly and effectively respond to the possibly devastating
effects of a pandemic event.
______________________
About Lee Colwell, DPA
Dr. Lee Colwell is President of the Pegasus Research Foundation.
In that capacity, Dr. Colwell leads the National Pegasus Program,
a Congressionally-led initiative developed by the Nation's Sheriffs
to enable information exchange among local law enforcement agencies
nationwide. Formerly, Dr. Colwell was Associate Director of the
FBI, the number two position in the Bureau, and led a nationwide
program to provide Internet access to local law enforcement.
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